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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner-Appellant Paul Ezra Rhoades ("Rhoades") appeals the district court's 
Order dismissing his successive Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing. 
Specifically, Rhoades challenges the district court's order denying his motion to amend 
his petition with two additional claims. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings And First Post-
Conviction Relief Case 
Denying Rhoades federal habeas relief, the federal district court recently detailed 
the facts leading to his convictions for the first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, 
robbery, rape and infamous crime against nature of Susan Michelbacher as follows: 
Early in the morning of March 19, 1987, Susan Michelbacher was 
feeling ill and decided to take the day off from her job as a special 
education teacher in Idaho Falls. She left home around 6:30 a.m., telling 
her husband that she intended to drop off her lesson plans at school and 
then return home to rest. 
Around 7:30 a.m., Valerie Stapf was looking for a place to park in 
a grocery store parking lot when she nearly collided head-on with a large, 
amber-colored van very similar to the one Michelbacher was driving that 
morning. Two people were sitting in the front seat. Stapf was never able 
to identify the driver, other than to note that it was a young woman who 
was similar in appearance to Susan Michelbacher, but Stapf would later 
testify that the passenger - whom she described as having long dark hair 
and being "real big, real kind of rough and dirty looking" - was Paul 
Rhoades, the Petitioner in this case. The female driver and Petitioner 
appeared to be agitated, and after a short stand-off, the van backed up and 
drove toward a bank at the far end of the parking lot. 
As soon as the bank opened, the van pulled up to the drive-in 
window. The teller recognized Michelbacher, who presented her with a 
check already made out for $ I ,000, which the teller cashed. Within a 
matter of minutes, Michelbacher arrived at a different drive-in branch of 
the same bank and again cashed a check for $1,000. 
That same day, Susan Browning was preparing to leave her 
residence in a rural area west of Idaho Falls when she observed this same 
amber-colored van coming to a stop on the shoulder of the highway, 
blocking her driveway. Browning claimed to see three people in the van, 
one of whom she later positively identified as Petitioner. She would also 
identify the other two individuals as Harry Burke, Petitioner's cousin, and 
Teresa Rhoades, Petitioner's sister, but she did not see anyone who 
matched Susan Michelbacher's description. After a few minutes, the van 
drove away. Two other witnesses would come forward and claim to have 
seen Petitioner, or someone matching his appearance, either driving or 
riding in the Michelbacher van. 
The van was discovered the next day in the same grocery store 
parking lot in which Valerie Stapf saw it the day before, but with an 
additional 150 to 200 miles on the odometer and a scratched exterior. 
Long brown hair consistent with Petitioner's hair was discovered inside. 
On March 21, Michelbacher's body was found in a remote area 
west ofldaho Falls. She had been raped, shot nine times, and her assailant 
had also ejaculated in her mouth, either as she was lingering near death or 
after she had already died. According to a State's serological expert, 
Petitioner could not be excluded as a source of the semen that was 
retrieved from the body, while Harry Burke and Michelbacher's husband 
could be excluded. 
The next day, when Petitioner arrived at an acquaintance's house 
with a large amount of cash, he remarked that he had just "come into some 
money" and was on his way to Jackpot, Nevada to gamble. A few hours 
later, he was spotted at a gas station between Idaho Falls and Jackpot, 
again with a roll of cash. Also around this time, Petitioner's mother, 
Pauline Rhoades, reported to police that her green Ford LTD had been 
stolen. 
On March 24, two truck drivers saw the Rhoades vehicle parked on 
a highway median in northern Nevada. A person matching Petitioner's 
description hurriedly exited the car, fumbled with something brown in his 
hands, and then jogged off into the sagebrush. A highway patrolman who 
responded to the accident scene found a .38 caliber handgun laying on the 
ground near the open door of the car, and ballistics testing would soon 
confirm that this weapon had fired the bullets that killed Michelbacher. 
Idaho authorities were notified that Pauline Rhoades' s car had 
been discovered, and officers proceeded to Nevada armed with a warrant 
for Petitioner's arrest for an unrelated burglary. Once there, they 
processed the car for evidence and found, among other items, ammunition 
that matched the typed used in the homicide. 
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The day after Petitioner abandoned his mother's car, Nevada law 
enforcement officers arrested him while he gambled at a casino in Wells. 
Idaho officers Victor Rodriguez and Dennis Shaw arrived shortly 
thereafter, and as they approached, Petitioner blurted out, "I did it." Upon 
hearing this, Rodriguez read Petitioner his Miranda warnings. After 
Petitioner had been transported to a highway patrol substation for 
processing, Detective Shaw mentioned that if he had arrested Petitioner 
sooner, three murder victims might still be alive. Petitioner responded to 
this comment by again saying, "I did it." 
Rhoades v. Arave, 2007 WL 951897, *1-2 (D. Idaho 2007). 
On March 29, 1987, a complaint was filed charging Rhoades with Susan's first-
degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, robbery, rape, infamous crime against nature and 
sentencing enhancements. (#17437, R., pp.1-3.)1 On July 2, 1987, the state filed a 
supplemental discovery response disclosing the forensic testing that had been completed: 
Don Wycoffs report relative to materials heretofore examined by 
him will be presented by July 13, 1987, additional reports maybe [sic] 
forthcoming as they relate to additional examinations of additional 
materials not heretofore examined. A report and additional witnesses will 
be forthcoming upon our receipt of the test results from a FBI Seriologist 
[sic]. These materials were submitted on June 2, 1987 and we expect 
them shortly. This submission to the FBI of a semen sample was done 
after consulting defendant's attorney Stephen Hart. 
(#17437, R., p.162.) The response further detailed the items previously disclosed by the 
state (#17437, R., pp.162-68), and explained: 
The foregoing materials have been provided in addition to the 
basic reports which have also been supplied. To the best ofmy knowledge 
the above constitutes the entire contents of our file on State v. Paul E. 
' The state has filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice, asking this Court to take judicial 
notice of Rhoades' underlying cases and various other pleadings relied upon by the 
district court. Therefore, the state will refer to those records and transcripts by their 
respective Idaho Supreme Court docket numbers. The supreme court docket number for 
Rhoades' underlying trial and sentencing is #17437. The supreme court docket number 
for his first post-conviction case is #18039. The supreme court docket number for 
Rhoades' instant appeal is #34236. The supreme court docket numbers for Rhoades' 
second successive post-conviction case and I.C.R. 35 motion are ##32897/32898. 
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Rhoades. However, if you have any questions or concerns regarding what 
you view to be inadequate disclosure please feel free to contact me at our 
office at anytime. In addition, please be advised that our file will be at 
your disposal for review and inspection on July 13, 1987, at the hour of 
I 0:00 o'clock a.m. Photocopy facilities are available should you find any 
materials you wish to copy. If and when additional materials or reports 
come within our possession or our knowledge and control, we will make 
these available forthwith. 
(#17437, R., pp.167-68.) Rhoades has never alleged he did not receive the F.B.I. 
serologist report as promised by the state. 
Rhoades filed a Motion and Order Requesting an Appointment of Expert Forensic 
Criminologist seeking the appointment of criminologist Richard Fox to "review and 
testify with regard to the blood, semen, hair and other trace evidence as well as ballistic 
testing and so forth," which the district court granted. (#17437, Tr., Vol.I, pp.214-25.)2 
Rhoades filed a motion asking that the state be required to provide various items of 
forensic evidence for independent testing, including semen samples taken from Susan's 
mouth. (#17437, R., pp.189-91.) Rhoades also sought an order requiring the state to list 
all physical evidence in its custody that had not been tested (#17437, R., pp.295-96), 
which, pursuant to the state's stipulation, was granted by the district court (#17437, Tr., 
Vol.II, p.386). The motion was renewed (#17437, R., pp.324-26) and, when questioned 
by the district court, the prosecutor expressly agreed Rhoades' expert had been provided 
the "substantial equivalent of what [was] sent to the FBI." (#17437, Tr., Vol.II, p.420). 
2 The state has scoured the Clerk's Record for Rhoades' written motion, but has been 
unsuccessful in locating the motion. Likewise, a formal written order is not contained in 
the Clerk's Record. However, it is clear from the transcript Rhoades filed a written 
motion and it was granted by the district court. For example, On November 30, 1987, 
Rhoades filed a responsive pleading stating, "As experts in this case, the defense intends 
to call Richard H. Fox, Sr. at the address noted on Attachment 'A' to present evidence 
dealing with ballistics, serology, hair and trace sampling, and the related forensic 
evidence." (#! 7437, R., p.412.) 
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As a result of a hearing, the district court found there had been substantial compliance 
with its prior order and the "vast majority of the materials have been provided." (#17437, 
Tr., Vol.II, p.432.) Rhoades was subsequently ordered to require Fox to return the 
forensic items to the state. (#17437, Tr., Vol.II, p.566.) In addressing the payment of 
experts, the district court also noted, "These scientific, technical and other experts have 
analyzed the evidence and assisted the defense in ballistics, serology, laboratory studies, 
fingerprinting and other scientific areas." (#17437, R, p.447.) For tactical reasons, 
Rhoades chose to not have Fox testify at trial. (#17437, Tr., Vol.III, pp.634-36.) 
A jury found Rhoades guilty of Susan's first-degree murder, first-degree 
kidnapping, robbery, rape and infamous crime against nature. (#17437, R., pp.623-27.) 
In March 1988, the district court sentenced Rhoades to death. (#17437, R., pp.714-37.) 
In May 1988, Rhoades filed a Request for Post Conviction Procedure Under 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719. (#18039, R., pp.1-2.) After an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court denied Rhoades post-conviction relief. (#18039, R., pp.249-72.) 
In a consolidated appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Rhoades' 
convictions, death sentence and the district court's denial of post-conviction relief. State 
v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 822 P.2d 960 (1991). 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Rhoades' Current Successive Post-Conviction Relief 
Case 
In 1993, a Statement of Issues Re Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in 
federal court on behalf of Rhoades. (#34236, R., p.172.) Rhoades' initial Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in 1994. (#34236, R., p.172, Dkt. 3.) After completing 
discovery, Rhoades filed an amended federal habeas petition. (#34236, R., p.177, Dkt. 
5 
76.) Rhoades moved to further amend his federal habeas petition (#34236, R., p.182, 
Dkt.154), but the federal district court denied that portion of his motion seeking to add 
new facts to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim (#34236, R., p.183, Dkt. 174). On 
March 28, 2007, the federal district court denied Rhoades habeas relief, see Rhoades v. 
Arave, 2007 WL951897; his appeal is pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
On June 28, 2002, while litigating his federal habeas case, Rhoades filed his 
current Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing, seeking testing of evidence 
collected at the time of Susan's murder; no specific claims challenging his conviction or 
sentence were raised in the petition. (#34236, R., pp.5-10.) The state filed a timely 
answer. (#34236, R., pp.14-17.) 
On July 29, 2005, Rhoades filed a Motion to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief (#35346, R., pp. l 06-08), seeking to add two additional claims, both based upon 
the F.B.I serologist report (#34236, R., pp.129-39). Based upon an affidavit from his 
new expert witness, Greg Hampikian, Ph.D. (#34236, R., pp.148-51), Rhoades contended 
in the first new claim (Count Two) that the F.B.I. report itself "exonerated Petitioner of 
the rape in the Bonneville capital case" and that the state failed to advise Rhoades' 
attorneys "of the exoneration," failed to correct the state's expert's trial testimony and 
"exaggerat[ed]" the expert's testimony during closing argument (#34236, R., pp.132-37). 
In the second new claim (Count Three), Rhoades contended, based upon the F.B.l. report 
and Dr. Hampikian' s affidavit, that he is innocent of the crimes for which he was 
convicted. (#34236, R., pp. 138-39.) The state filed an objection asserting the two claims 
are procedurally barred under LC. § 19-2719 because they were known or reasonably 
could have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition. (#34236, R., 
6 
pp.158-63.) The state further asserted Rhoades failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact under the UPCP A because he failed to establish the state (1) withheld exculpatory 
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the F.B.I. report 
was actually provided to his attorneys prior to trial, or (2) knowingly used perjured 
testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). (#34236, R., pp.166-
67.) Finding Rhoades' case and motion to amend were governed by I.C. § 19-2719, the 
district court denied his motion because the new claims were known or reasonably could 
have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition; the court declined to 
address the state's alternate argument under the UPCP A. (#34236, R., pp.211-17.) 
On March 6, 2007, Rhoades withdrew count one of his Petition for Post-
Conviction Scientific Testing, but noted the district court's denial of his motion to amend 
and his intent to appeal that ruling. (#34236, R., pp.219-21.) Based upon his motion, the 
district court dismissed Rhoades' petition on March 16, 2007. (#34236, R., p.222.) 
Rhoades filed a timely Notice of Appeal on April 26, 2007. (#34236, R., pp.223-27.)3 
'Rhoades also filed another successive post-conviction petition and an I.C.R. 35 motion, 
contending his death sentences are unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002) (##32897/32898, R., pp.4-13), which the district court dismissed (##32897/32898, 
R., pp.262-67). This Court granted the state's Motion to Dismiss Appeal. The Supreme 
Court recently granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded Rhoades' case for 
"further consideration in light of Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 
169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008)." Rhoades v. IdalJO, --- U.S.---, 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008). 
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ISSUES 
Rhoades has stated the issues on appeal as follows: 
(1) Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's 
motion to amend even though Petitioner had no notice of the prosecutorial 
misconduct claims until he consulted an expert out of an abundance of 
caution, and even though neither trial defendants nor post-conviction 
petitioners have any obligation to search for evidence of prosecutorial 
misdeeds, absent notice of their existence; 
(2) Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's 
motion to amend even though Petitioner had no notice of the factual basis 
of the actual innocence claim, and even though neither trial defendants nor 
postconviction petitioners have any obligation to search for evidence of 
actual innocence; and 
(3) Whether denying Petitioner who presented a prima facie claim of 
actual innocence leave to litigate that claim even though he may not 
otherwise have met the timeliness requirements ofldaho Code Section 19-
2719( 5)( c) violated his right to bring such claims pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 4901(a)(4) [sic] and whether it violated his rights against cruel and 
unusual punishment and to due process as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the 
Idaho Constitution, Article I, Sections 6 and 13; and Sivak v. State, 134 
Idaho 641, 642 8 P.3d 636, 647 (Idaho 2000) ("Applying this rule as the 
State requests would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain 
evidence of actual innocence in successive post-conviction petitions, even 
where the evidence was clearly material or had been suppressed by 
prosecutorial misconduct."). 
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
Prior to trial Rhoades was provided a copy of the F.B.I. serologist's report and an 
expert to review and independently test the forensic evidence collected during the 
investigation of Susan's murder. Because Rhoades failed to make a prima facie showing 
that the two claims he desired to add to his Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known when he filed his first post-
conviction petition, is this Court deprived of jurisdiction to hear this appeal? 
Alternatively, 
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Because the two additional claims were known or reasonably could have been 
known when he filed his first post-conviction petition, has Rhoades failed to establish the 




This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Hear Rhoades' Appeal Because The Two Claims 
In His Motion To Amend Were Known Or Reasonably Could Have Been Known When 
He Filed His First Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
The two claims Rhoades wished to add to his successive petition are both based 
upon the F.B.l. serology report and Dr. Hampikian's affidavits. Rhoades contends the 
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend because he was not 
"duty-bound to search for prosecutorial deceit and other misdeeds absent notice of its 
existence" (Appellant's brief, p. I 0) and there was "no ... evidence putting him on notice 
that the prosecution elicited false testimony from its forensic expert, that the FBI testing 
exonerated Petitioner, and, therefore, that the prosecutor failed to correct either its 
forensic expert's false testimony or his grossly misleading testimony" (Appellant's brief, 
p.13). 
Idaho Code § 19-2719 imposes a jurisdictional bar if the two claims Rhoades 
desired to add to his successive petition do not meet the stringent requirements of LC. § 
19-2719(5). Because Rhoades has failed to make a prima facie showing that the 
additional claims fit within the narrow exception provided by I.C. § 19-2719(5), this 
Court is without jurisdiction to review the merits of his appeal requiring that it be 
dismissed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently explained, "When faced with a motion to 
dismiss an appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2719, 'the proper standard of review this 
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Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the 
requirements of section 19-2719 have been met and rule accordingly."' Row v. State, 
145 Idaho 168, ···, 177 P.3d 382,384 (2008) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 
575, 51 P.3d 387 (2002)). 
C. Rhoades' Successive Post-Conviction Petition And His Current Appeal Are 
Governed By LC.§ 19-2719(5) 
Idaho Code § 19-2719 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures 
in all capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction 
proceedings which are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
(UPCP A), are civil in nature and governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). Idaho Code§ 19-2719 does 
not eliminate the applicability of the UPCP A in capital cases, but acts as a modifier and 
"supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict." McKinney v. State, 
133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144 (1999); Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 470. 
Specifically, LC. § 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise 
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which 
must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho . 
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in LC. § 19-2719(5), 
which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated 
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within 
the time frame allowed by the statute." Id., 120 Idaho at 807. If a capital defendant fails 
to comply with the specific requirements of LC. § 19-2719, including the specified time 
limits, the issues are "deemed to have [been] waived" and "[t]he courts of Idaho shall 
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have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any 
such relief" J.C.§ 19-2719(5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700. 
A capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has 
a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that 
petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 
471. Even if the petitioner can demonstrate the claims were not known or could not 
reasonably have been known, LC. § l 9-2719(5)(a) details the additional requirements that 
must be met before the successive petition may be heard: 
An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be 
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a 
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material 
facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand 
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that 
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or 
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed. 
LC.§ 19-2719(5)(a). 
Finally, LC.§ 19-2719(5)(b) explains that a successive post-conviction petition is 
"facially insufficient" if it merely alleges "matters that are cumulative or impeaching or 
would not, even if the allegations were true, cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction 
or sentence." If evidence is merely cumulative with evidence already within the 
possession of the defense at the time the first petition for post-conviction relief is filed, a 
procedural bar exists mandating dismissal of the successive petition. Sivak v. State, 134 
Idaho 641, 647-49, 8 P.3d 636 (2000). 
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If the petitioner fails to comply with each of the requirements detailed in LC. § 
19-2719(5), the petition must be summarily dismissed. Idaho Code § 19-2719(5) 
specifically provides: 
If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section 
and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived 
such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been 
known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such 
claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief. 
(Emphasis added); see also Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-90, 17 P.3d 230 (2000). 
In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the Idaho Supreme 
Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the passage of LC. § 19-2719: 
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to 
expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of 
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences." 
The statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by 
requiring that all collateral claims for relief ... be consolidated in one 
proceeding .... " We hold that the legislature's determination that it was 
necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational 
basis for the imposition of the 42-day time limit set for l.C. § 19-2719. 
The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with 
a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative 
purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences. 
The United States Supreme Court has specifically approved requiring a criminal 
defendant to present all of his collateral claims in a single post-conviction proceeding. In 
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court, discussing federal habeas corpus 
proceedings which prohibit piecemeal litigation by requiring that all claims be brought in 
a single petition for a writ of habeas corpus, explained the respective states can employ a 
similar procedure for post-conviction relief procedures. The Court concluded: 
There can be no doubt that States may likewise provide, as Maine 
has done, that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all 
known constitutional claims in a single proceeding. Indeed, the Court of 
Appeals agreed that the Maine statutory scheme was an "orderly 
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procedure of the state courts," as that term is used in Fay v. Noia, [372 
U.S. 391, 438, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963)]. No prisoner 
has a right either under the Federal Constitution or under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
to insist upon piecemeal collateral attack on a presumptively valid 
criminal conviction in the face of such a statutory provision. 
Id. at 45-46. 
Idaho Code § 19-2719 also has a great deal of interplay with federal habeas law. 
The ability of a state to ensure its judgments carry a measure of finality rather than being 
subject to repetitive federal attack depends in substantial measure on the regular and 
consistent enforcement of state procedural rules and bars. Addressing the interplay 
between state procedural bars and federal review, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. 
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988), refused to honor a state procedural bar, 
explaining: 
[W]e consider whether that bar provides an adequate and independent 
state ground for the refusal to vacate petitioner's sentence. "[W]e have 
consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in 
compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a 
federal question is itself a federal question." Henry v. Mississippi, 379 
U.S. 443, 447, [85 S. Ct. 564, 567, 13 L. Ed. 2d 408] (1965). "[A] state 
procedural ground is not 'adequate' unless the procedural rule is 'strictly 
or regularly followed.' Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, (84 
S. Ct. 1734, 1736, 12 L. Ed. 2d 766] (! 964)." Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 
U.S. 255, 262-263, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 2426-2427, 72 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1982); 
see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 447-448, 85 S. Ct. at 567-568. We 
find no evidence that the procedural bar relied on by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court here has been consistently or regularly applied. Rather, 
the weight of Mississippi law is to the contrary. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has historically followed the requirements of I.C. § 19-
2719, strictly and regularly dismissing successive capital post-conviction relief appeals 
because of petitioners' failure to meet the narrow exception of LC. § 19-2719(5). See 
e.g., Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 51 PJd 387 (2002); Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257, 
32 PJd 151 (2001); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001); Rhoades v. State, 
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135 Idaho 299, I 7 P.3d 243 (2000); Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (1996); 
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995); Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100, 
897 P.2d 991 (1995); Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); Fetterly v. 
State, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991). The court has also historically followed the 
requirements of l.C. § 19-2719, strictly and regularly affirming the district courts' 
dismissal of successive capital post-conviction claims because of petitioners' failure to 
meet the narrow exception of I.C. § 19-2719(5), including the pleading requirements of 
I.C. §§ 19-2719(5)(a) and (b). See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000); 
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 
P.3d 636 (2000); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144 (1999). 
D. This Court Should Dismiss The Instant Appeal Without Addressing The Merits 
Of Rhoades' Motion To Amend 
As noted above, a capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-
conviction relief has a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that 
issues raised in that petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." 
Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 471; see also McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. If a petitioner fails to 
make the requisite showing, "The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any 
such claims for relief." Idaho Code § 19-2719(5). In Fetterly. 121 Idaho at 419, the 
court recognized the petitioner's failure to raise the issues in his first petition for post-
conviction relief resulted in a waiver of the issues. As a result, the court dismissed the 
appeal. Id. In Paz, the petitioner filed a motion to stay execution after the district court 
dismissed his second petition for post-conviction relief. Shortly thereafter, the supreme 
court ordered the respective parties to simultaneously file briefs addressing the question 
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of whether there were new grounds for post-conviction review. After reviewing the 
briefing and hearing oral argument addressing only the jurisdictional issue, the Idaho 
Supreme Court dismissed Paz's appeal. Id., 123 Idaho at 758-60. 
In Lankford, 127 Idaho at 101, the state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal 
alleging Idaho Code § 19-2719 barred consideration of the petitioner's successive 
petition. After reviewing the claims asserted in the successive petition and the supporting 
documents, the court concluded Lankford "failed to assert any claim not barred by LC. § 
19-2719," and dismissed his appeal. Id. at 102. 
By dismissing a petitioner's appeal from the denial of a successive petition for 
post-conviction relief, this Court sends a clear message to the federal courts of its intent 
to consistently apply the procedural bar associated with LC. § 19-2719 and that the basis 
for the decision is the procedural bar, not federal law. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 
U.S. 722 (1991). The Supreme Court has recognized, "It is not always easy for a federal 
court to apply the independent and adequate state ground doctrine." Id. at 732. 
However, when this Court explicitly invokes the state procedural bar, the state decision is 
based upon an independent and adequate state rule even if the Court alternatively 
addresses the merits of a federal claim. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. IO (I 989). 
When this Court's opinions addressing successive post-conviction petitions do not "fairly 
appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law," it cannot be 
presumed the court based its decision on federal law. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735. 
However, when, as in Coleman, this Court "state[s] plainly it [is] granting the [state's] 
motion to dismiss the ... appeal," at 740-41, the federal courts recognize the Court's 
application ofl.C. § 19-2719 and that it is an independent and adequate state bar. 
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Alternatively, this Court can affirm the district court's decision, even on a 
different basis. Pierce v. State, 142 Idaho 32, 34, 121 P.3d 963 (2005). For example, in 
McKinney, 133 Idaho at 708, the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of a successive 
petition, concluding, "McKinney has waived the following issues under I.C. § 19-2719 
because he either actually knew them, or reasonably should have known them, at the time 
he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief." In Sivak, 134 Idaho at 644-45, the 
court affirmed after concluding, "The State's prosecutorial misconduct in allowing 
Leytham's false testimony at trial to go uncorrected was an issue which reasonably 
should have been known at the time of Sivak's first petition." In Pizzuto, 134 Idaho at 
797, the court affirmed after concluding, "Since the withheld information of which 
Pizzuto complains in this successive petition would have been used only to impeach the 
testimony of Rice and Odom, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the third 
amended petition for post-conviction relief." 
Because, as detailed below, Rhoades has not made a prima facie showing that the 
claims he desired to add to his successive petition comply with the dictates of I.C. § 19-
2719, his appeal must be dismissed or, alternatively, the district court must be affirmed. 
E. The Two Claims Rhoades Desired To Add To His Successive Petition Do Not Fit 
Within The Exception Of I.C. § 19-2719(5) 
The withholding of evidence by a prosecutor from the defense that is favorable to 
the accused, irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith, violates due process if the 
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 
(1963). Under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the Supreme Court explained the 
state cannot obtain a conviction through the use of evidence that is known to the state to 
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be false. "The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, 
allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Id. at 269. 
However, as explained in McKinney, 133 Idaho at 706-07, "Even if the State 
violated [Rhoades'] right to due process by withholding evidence, [Rhoades] was 
required to raise this issue, like other constitutional issues, within the time frame 
mandated by I.C. § 19-2719." See also Porter, 136 Idaho at 261. In a successive petition 
for post-conviction relief, Rhoades must "make the required prima facie showing that the 
issues could not reasonably have been known during the first proceeding." McKinney, 
133 Idaho at 707. Therefore, the court must "initially examine[] whether the information 
alleged by [Rhoades] to be exculpatory reasonably should have been known at the time of 
[Rhoades'] first post-conviction petition." Porter, 136 Idaho at 261. 
The two claims Rhoades wished to add to his successive petition are both based 
upon the F .B.I. serology report, which, according to Dr. Hampikian, "did absolutely 
exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen" and "this is a complete exclusion, 
and the FBI report contained a clear unqualified conclusion." (#34236, R., pp.125, 127.) 
However, these claims were known or reasonably could have been known when Rhoades 
filed his first post-conviction petition. 
As detailed above, Rhoades has never contended the state failed to provide him a 
copy of the F .B.I. report upon which Dr. Hampikian bases his conclusion, only that he 
recently retained Dr. Hampikian who has rendered an opinion different from that of the 
state's expert, Donald Wyckoff. The first indication that the F.B.I. was testing forensic 
evidence was on July 2, 1987, discussed in the state's supplemental discovery response, 
which reported, "A report and additional witnesses will be forthcoming upon our receipt 
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of the test results from a FBI Seriologist [sic]. These materials were submitted on June 2, 
1987 and we expect them shortly. This submission to the FBI of a semen sample was 
done after consulting defendant's attorney Stephen Hart." (#17437, R., p.162.) 
Not only did the state provide Rhoades a copy of the report, he was also provided 
the expert forensic criminologist of his choosing, Richard Fox, to "review and testify 
with regard to the blood, semen, hair and other trace evidence as well as ballistic testing 
and so forth." (#17437, Tr., Vol.I, pp.214-25.) Fox was provided the "substantial 
equivalent of what [was] sent to the F.B.I." (#17437, Tr., Vol.II, p.420.) Rhoades has 
completely failed to establish Fox not only was provided the F.B.I. report, but the 
forensic evidence to review and complete any additional testing. 
In one of Dr. Hampikian's subsequent affidavits, he opined: 
The analysis I conducted was generally, perhaps universally, 
accepted by the community of forensic biologists as well as the 
community of forensic serologists in 1987. Further, once the FBI 
completed its testing and thereby determined the values of the PGM 
alleles (the plus and minus characteristics), whether Mr. Rhoades was a 
potential contributor of the semen was not a matter of interpretation or 
opinion. Any forensic scientist with expertise in PGM analysis would 
have reached the same conclusion as I did in my June 20, 2005, affidavit. 
The FBI PGM testing absolutely excluded Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of 
the semen. 
(#34236, R., p.198.) In another affidavit, Dr. Hampikian further opined: 
Additionally, and to further clarify my December 12, affidavit, the 
kind of analysis I conducted to arrive at the conclusions I reached in my 
June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only universally accepted by forensic 
biologists and forensic serologists in 1987, it also was a basic tool known 
to and employed by forensic experts in investigating offenses where 
evidence containing body fluids might help uncover a perpetrator's 
identity. The kind of analysis I employed using the FBI PGM subtyping 
testing results was, in 1987, on a par with similar uses of blood typing 
results .... 
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.... The results reported by the FBI in its July 13, 1987, letter to 
Ms. Marcum were clear, unambiguous, and used a standard reporting 
language that would be understood by any forensic serologist or forensic 
biologist of the day .... This result completely excludes Mr. Rhodes [sic] 
from being the donor of the semen sample found on the victim which was 
typed as PGMsub I +. Furthermore, there is no indication in the FBI 
report that this finding could be an artifact, or that there was any evidence 
of a mixture in the sample. The standard and universally accepted 
conclusion in 1987 (as today) is that the known sample from Paul Rhodes 
[sic] does not match the questioned semen sample (Q 1) taken from the 
victim's body. Paul Rhoades is excluded as a contributor of the semen 
sample Ql. 
(#34236, R., pp.201-02.) 
Based upon the state having provided the F.B.I. serologist report to Rhoades prior 
to trial and Fox having been appointed by the district court to review the report and 
forensic evidence, the two additional claims Rhoades desired to add to his successive 
petition were clearly known or reasonably could have been known when he filed his post-
conviction petition, particularly in light of Dr. Hampikian's opinion that any forensic 
expert in 1987 would have reached the same conclusion based only upon the F.B.I. 
serologist report. However, even if Fox did not review the report, Rhoades was provided 
a copy of the report and could have retained Hampikian or some other expert during his 
first post-conviction case to ascertain whether the F.B.I. report was susceptible to a 
different interpretation than the opinion provided at trial by the state's experts. 
Rhoades' reliance upon Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), is 
seriously misplaced. As detailed above, the F.B.I. report and the appointment of Fox to 
review the forensic evidence clearly provided Rhoades the opportunity to establish 
whether the F.B.I. 's testing actually exonerated Rhoades. Dr. Hampikian's affidavits 
clearly establish his opinion is based upon the report itself. Therefore, Sivak actually 
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supports the state's position that Rhoades' claims were known or reasonably could have 
been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition. 
Rhoades' reliance upon Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990), is 
also misplaced. Not only did the report and Fox's appointment provide Rhoades with the 
tools necessary to raise the two additional claims, but Stuart was based upon the UPCP A, 
not the limitations of LC.§ 19-2719. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807 n.l, 820 P.2d 
665 (1991) ("It must be noted that Stuart was not decided pursuant to LC. § 19-2719. 
This statute was not cited by either Stuart or the State."). 
Rhoades further contends, "Affirming the lower court's denial will close the door 
to Petitioner who has proffered a prima facie case of actual innocence. Denying 
Petitioner the ability to litigate his prima facie claim would violate his rights. . . . " 
(Appellant's brief, p.18.) However, this Court has never established an exception to the 
limitations of LC. § 19-2719(5) based upon a claim of "actual innocence." Rather, the 
authority upon which Rhoades relies is premised upon federal habeas law, not LC. § 19-
2719; there is no exception for an alleged claim of"actual innocence" under Idaho law. 
Further, Rhoades' contention that he has established a "prima facie case of actual 
innocence" is greatly exaggerated. Not only does he ignore the circumstantial evidence 
presented by the state, particularly ballistics testing, but he ignores the fact that he 
withdrew his first claim in the instant petition and refused to disclose the results of the 
DNA testing that was conducted. Additionally, in denying Rhoades federal habeas relief, 
the federal district court examined Dr. Hampikian's opinion in the context of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and noted that Dr. Hampikian has subsequently 
admitted his previous affidavit contained a typographical error and "acknowledges that 
21 
the FBI's result could be based on the victim's contribution to the swab." Rhoades, 2007 
WL 951897, *32. Addressing this issue, the court explained: 
Petitioner has not indicated how an opinion similar to Dr. 
Harnpikian's would have materially assisted the defense at trial. Certainly 
trial counsel could not have argued that the report exonerated petitioner, 
because there is apparently no way of knowing whether it is the second 
possibility - the victim's own tissue sample on the swab - that accounted 
for the result. Further, co-counsel Stephen Hart covered this possibility 
extensively during his cross-examination of Mr. Wyckoff, at least as it 
pertained to the State lab's result. 
Addressing the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the 
court further explained: 
[E]ven if the State's general serological evidence were eliminated, the 
other incriminating evidence remained strong, including the ballistics, 
hairs found in the van and on the victim's body, the "I did it" statements, 
Petitioner's possession of the murder weapon, eyewitness accounts that 
placed him in the van, and his unexplained windfall of cash immediately 
after the homicide. 
As a result, this Court concludes that there is no reasonable 
probability of a different outcome had Petitioner's counsel developed and 
presented an opinion of the FBI report similar to the one now proposed by 
Dr. Harnpikian. 
Because Rhoades has failed to make a prima facie showing that the information 
upon which he bases his two additional claims was not known or reasonably could not 




Rhoades Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
His Motion To Amend Because The Two Additional Claims Were Futile 
A. Introduction 
Should this Court determine it must address the merits of Rhoades' Motion to 
Amend, the district court's decision denying his motion must be affirmed because the two 
additional claims are futile. Not only were the claims barred by LC. § 19-2719(5), 
Rhoades failed to establish the state violated Brady, by withholding exculpatory 
evidence, that the state knowingly used perjured testimony in violation of Napue, or that 
he is actually innocent. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because post-conviction cases are generally governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820 (2000), Rhoades' motion to 
amend his post-conviction petition is governed by I.R.C.P. 15(a). "The denial of a 
plaintiffs motion to amend a complaint to add another cause of action is governed by an 
abuse of discretion standard of review." Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn 
Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, ---, 177 P.3d 955,959 (2008) (quoting Est. of Becker 
v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d 623 (2004)). 
C. Rhoades' Two Additional Claims Are Futile 
Because the state had already filed an answer, Rhoades could not amend his 
petition without "leave of court" or "written consent of the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 
15(a). While "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires," I.R.C.P. 15(a), the 
district court still had discretion to deny a motion to amend. Black Canyon Racquetball 
23 
v. First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900 (1991). The Idaho Supreme Court 
has explained: 
In determining whether an amended complaint should be allowed, 
where leave of court is required under Rule 15(a), the court may consider 
whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by the 
amended complaint state a valid claim. Bissett v. State, 111 Idaho 865, 
869, 727 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Ct. App. 1986) ("The record which was before 
the trial court contains no allegations which, if proven, would entitle 
Bissett to the injunctive relief he claims. In addition, Bissett has failed to 
state on appeal any additional allegations which would establish a cause of 
action. . . . We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
failing to allow amendment of Bissett's complaint.") If the amended 
pleading does not set out a valid claim, or if the opposing party would be 
prejudiced by the delay in adding the new claim, or if the opposing party 
has an available defense such as a statute of limitations, it is not an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file the amended 
complaint. 
Rhoades has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by refusing 
to add the prosecutorial misconduct claims because the state had "an available defense 
such as a statute of limitations." As detailed above, Rhoades' prosecutorial misconduct 
claims are barred by LC. § 19-2719, thereby making those claims futile. 
Additionally, even if the claims were not barred by LC. § 19-2719, they are futile. 
Admittedly, the withholding of evidence by a prosecutor from the defense that is 
favorable to the accused, irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith, violates due 
process only if the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 
87. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 678, 682 (1985), the Supreme Court examined 
the issue of "materiality" by looking at Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), 
and concluded, "The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability, that, 
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
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been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 682. Additionally, it is clear that Brady applies to 
impeachment evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675-76. 
To establish a prosecutorial misconduct claim based upon perjured testimony, 
Rhoades was required to present sufficient evidence to prove the prosecutor obtained a 
conviction "by the knowing use of perjured testimony." Paradis v. State, 1 IO Idaho 534, 
538, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)) 
( emphasis added). If Rhoades makes such a showing, the conviction "must be set aside if 
there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony would have affected the 
judgment of the jury." Id. "This standard is a 'strict standard of materiality not just 
because [these cases] involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more importantly because 
they involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process."' Id. ( quoting 
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104). 
As discussed above, the state did not withhold evidence. Rather, the FBI 
serologist report was provided to Rhoades prior to his trial. Neither has Rhoades 
provided any evidence that the state withheld evidence that was not detailed in the report. 
Further, Rhoades has provided no evidence that the state was aware of any opinions 
contrary to the state's expert's opinion. Rhoades has merely provided the affidavit of a 
newly hired expert who has offered an opinion different than the opinion offered by the 
state's expert, clearly distinguishing his case from Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004), 
in which the state was actually aware of exculpatory evidence and false testimony. 
Finally, as detailed above, albeit in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the federal district court has already determined Rhoades has failed to meet 
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Brady's materiality standard by concluding he failed to establish prejudice under 
Strickland. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (equating the prejudice 
inquiry under Strickland with the materiality inquiry under Brady). 
Likewise, as detailed above, Rhoades' "actual innocence" claim is unavailing. 
Rhoades failed to establish either federal or Idaho law permits the filing of a freestanding 
"actual innocence" claim. The Supreme Court has never found a constitutional violation 
based only upon a freestanding actual innocence claim. In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
390, 400 (1993), the Court explained, "Claims of actual innocence based on newly 
discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief 
absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal 
proceedings." As noted by the Ninth Circuit, "actual innocence" is "not itself a 
constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass 
to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." Majoy v. 
Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776 n.l (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,315 
(1995)); see also Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 673 (9th Cir. 2002); Coley v. 
Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 
(1993)). Other circuits have also adopted this analysis. See, e.g., Lafevers v. Gibson, 
238 F.3d 1263, 1265 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 741 (5th 
Cir. 2000); Mansfield v. Dormire, 202 F.3d 1018, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 2000). Recently, the 
Supreme Court once again declined to address the question of whether a freestanding 
claim of actual innocence is cognizable in federal habeas in capital cases, determining 
even if such a claim existed, the petitioner had failed to meet his burden. House v. Bell, 
547 U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006). 
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Likewise, Idaho appears to have rejected the idea of a freestanding "actual 
i1mocence" claim. In Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516, 520, 975 P.2d 1181 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(emphasis omitted), the court distinguished Schlup, in part, because the petitioner's claim 
was "substantive rather than procedural. Hays does not allege that there is an underlying 
constitutional violation that resulted in his conviction." 
Even if a freestanding actual innocence claim is recognized, Rhoades has failed to 
meet the test articulated in Schlup. As explained by the Supreme Court: 
To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is 
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted in 
light of the new evidence. The petitioner thus is required to make a 
stronger showing than that needed to establish prejudice. At the same 
time, the showing of "more likely than not" imposes a lower burden of 
proof than the "clear and convincing" standard required under Sawyer. 
Id. 513 U.S. at 327 ( emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
In Schlup, the Court made several observations regarding the actual innocence 
standard. First, in assessing the adequacy of a petitioner's showing, the court is not 
bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial. "Instead, the emphasis on 
'actual innocence' allows the reviewing tribunal also to consider the probative force of 
relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial." Id. The reviewing 
court makes its determination "in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have 
been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence 
tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after 
the trial." Id. at 328. 
Second, the reasonable doubt standard is not discarded. Rather, "the analysis 
must incorporate the understanding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt marks the legal 
boundary between guilt and innocence." Id. 
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Third, the standard is not based upon the mere showing that reasonable doubt 
exists in light of the new evidence. Rather, the Court explained the standard is: 
[T]hat no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. It is not 
the district court's independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt 
exists that the standard addresses; rather the standard requires the district 
court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, 
properly instructed jurors would do. Thus, a petitioner does not meet the 
threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of 
the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find 
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 329. 
Finally, the Court highlighted the word "reasonable," noting, "It must be 
presumed that a reasonable juror would consider fairly all of the evidence presented. It 
must be presumed that such a juror would conscientiously obey the instructions of the 
trial court requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that this standard "is not easy to meet," 
Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002), and is "narrow" in scope, 
Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, "[t]o be credible, a claim 
of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not presented at trial." Id. at 982. 
Because such evidence is rare, "in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence 
has been summarily rejected." Id. Further, the Eighth Circuit has concluded not only 
must the evidence be new because it was unavailable at trial, the petitioner must establish 
it could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Amrine 
v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1230 (8th Cir. 1997); Morris v. Dormire, 217 F.3d 556,559 
(8th Cir. 2000); see also Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528, 533 (4th Cir. 2003). 
Based upon the Schlup standard, Rhoades has failed to establish actual innocence. 
As noted above, the federal district court has previously addressed the F.B.I. serologist 
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report and Dr. Hampikian 's conclusion in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel 
and determined Rhoades failed to establish prejudice. Rhoades v. Arave, 2007 WL 
951897, *31-33. Because the Schlup actual innocence standard is even more difficult 
than the Strickland prejudice standard, Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, Rhoades has failed to 
establish "actual innocence." 
The evidence in this case was simply overwhelming, and merely because Rhoades 
has found a new expert who has provided another interpretation of the F.B.I. report 
regarding the semen found in Susan's mouth does not establish "actual innocence." 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that Rhoades' appeal be dismissed or, alternatively, 
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed on appeal. 
DATED THIS 5th day of June, 2008. 
Deputy Attorney eneral and 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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